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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the self-presentation and online discursive practices of grass-
roots hacker collectives on both sides of the Ukraine-Russia conflict within a 
larger geopolitical climate of a contested globalisation agenda and a growing 
fear of cyber warfare. Both pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian hacker groups 
engage in DDoS attacks, malware distribution and leaking stolen information 
from the opposing side. They also use social media to enter the broader political 
discourse around the conflict. The paper analyses the Twitter posts of both col-
lectives to reveal key modes of online practices and key discursive themes in the 
context of the conflict, such as political activism, information warfare, hacker 
ethics and patriotism. The study elucidates how these groups use their social 
media presence to construct a ‘patriotic hacker’ identity for themselves, to dele-
gitimise their opponents and ultimately, to connect to the broader populist dis-
course, where issues of patriotism, sovereignty and nationhood are contested.
INTRODUCTION
On 1 June 2017 Russian President Vladimir Putin held a press event with inter-
national news agencies as part of his participation in the Petersburg International 
Economic Forum. Responding to a question about possible Russian meddling 
in elections in Germany, Putin unequivocally denied the Kremlin’s involvement 
in any hacking attacks or interference in the 2016 US presidential vote, saying 
these hackers could have come from any country.1 He did, however, have an 
interesting corollary to add:
*This article is based on the author’s contribution to a roundtable at the annual conference of 
the  International Affairs Standing Committee of the Royal Irish Academy, titled ‘Retreat from 
Globalisation? Brexit, Trump and the New Populism’, which took place at the Royal Irish Academy 
in Dublin on 31 May 2017. This research was supported in part by funding under the 2016–17 Journal 
Publication Scheme of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Dublin City University.
1John Fraher and Ilya Arkhipov, ‘Putin says patriotic hackers could be fighting for Russia’, 
Bloomberg, 1 June 2017, available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017–06–01/
putin-says-patriotic-hackers-could-be-fighting-for-russia-j3eb8n22 (accessed 6 September 2017). 
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Hackers are free people, like artists: they wake up in a good mood and they 
start painting. It’s the same with hackers, if  they woke up and read about 
something happening in international relations, and if  they’re patriotically 
inclined, they will do their part.2
Putin’s remark indicates the broader ongoing debate about the role of ‘rogue’ 
non- state actors in geopolitical events and their amorphous relationship with nation 
states in cases such as elections, military conflicts and civic uprisings. This paper 
explores the self-presentation and online identity performance of self-proclaimed 
grass-roots hacker collectives on both sides of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. 
Specifically, it is interested in the role hackers play in this arena beyond their efforts 
to disrupt or damage opponents and their alleged ties to nation states. How does 
the discourse generated by hackers and around them shape the public’s understand-
ing of the parties to the conflict and contribute to the overall political climate 
around these events?
The conflict between Ukraine and Russia that began shortly after the 
Euromaidan protests in the spring of  2014 is a curious phenomenon that most 
have stopped short of  calling a war.3 In the spring of  2014, Russia annexed the 
Crimean Peninsula (officially Ukrainian territory), and later covertly sup-
ported armed separatist rebellions in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of 
eastern Ukraine, providing weapons, military training, troops and equipment, 
and humanitarian aid.4 Beyond explicit and covert military activity on the 
ground, Russia and pro-Russian forces have also engaged in what has been 
termed ‘hybrid warfare’—manipulating information about and coverage of 
the conflict through state media propaganda and social media astroturfing, 
engaging in diplomatic games and resorting to other ‘active measures’, includ-
ing hacking, leaks and DDoS attacks on Ukrainian websites and infrastruc-
ture.5,6 Especially on the cyber warfare front, the Ukrainian side has often 
responded in kind. A key issue in the context of  these digital attacks is that 
identifying the actors behind them is difficult, and it isn’t always possible to 
explicitly identify whether these activities are supported by state actors or are 
the work of  digital vigilantes acting independently on either side. Increasingly, 
however, we can observe these ‘rogue’ individuals and groups entering the 
public limelight.
While the military action in Crimea and, for the past three years, parts of 
eastern Ukraine occupied by Russia-supported separatist forces has been 
bloody and ongoing, a no less ardent battle has been waged online. Both 
pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian hacker groups actively engage in DDoS 
attacks, malware distribution and leaking stolen information from ‘the other 
side’. They also use social media to enter the broader political discourse around 
2Lenta.Ru, ‘Putin compares hackers to free artists’ [‘Путин сравнил хакеров со свободными 
художниками’], 1 June 2017, available at: https://lenta.ru/news/2017/06/01/hudohakeri/ 
(6 September 2017). 
3The Euromaidan protests started in Ukraine in November 2013 in response to the refusal of 
then president Viktor Yanukovych to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, and lasted into 
the spring of 2014, becoming a broader pro-European movement against government corruption, 
abuse of power and police brutality.
4Maria Snegovaya, ‘Putin’s information warfare in Ukraine: Soviet origins of Russia’s hybrid 
warfare’, Russia Report 1 (September 2015).
5Ralph D. Thiele, ‘Crisis in Ukraine: the emergence of hybrid warfare’, ISPSW Strategic Series 
347 (2015), 1–13.
6Andy Greenberg, ‘How an entire nation became Russia’s test lab for cyberwar’, WIRED, 
20  June 2017, available at: https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/ 
(6 September 2017).
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the conflict and to create and manage public identities and profiles online. The 
most influential among these groups are CyberBerkut, a pro-Russian hacker 
group, and Ukrainian Cyber Alliance, a pro-Ukrainian collective. Both groups 
have an active online presence, chiefly on social media platforms such as 
Twitter and Facebook.
The paper examines the discourse in the Twitter posts of both collectives 
 during  the conflict period (2014–17) in the context of extremist hacking as an 
emerging part of modern hybrid warfare. This study is chiefly concerned with 
understanding how these groups manage the discourse about their activity online 
by way of narrating their own exploits and making meaning of their actions.
The paper poses the following research questions:
 1. To what ends do hackers in the Ukraine-Russia conflict engage in public 
and political discourse on social media? What kind of direct action and 
discursive action do these groups engage in online?
 2. What are the specific discursive approaches that pro-Russian and 
pro-Ukrainian hackers employ during the conflict to construct their own 
identity and that of their opponents on social media? How do these discur-
sive identities resonate with the broader political/geopolitical discourse?
The analysis reveals key modes of social media discourse (such as promoting 
political views or linking to leaks) and its key themes in the context of the con-
flict, such as political extremism, information warfare, hacker ethics, grass-roots 
activism and patriotism. The paper also considers the differences between how 
each group discusses these themes and uses them to frame their own identity and 
that of their opponents. With added analysis of the exploitation of other Twitter 
platform mechanics (e.g., hashtags, retweets, mentions and embedded content) 
by each hacker group, the paper elucidates how these groups use their social 
media presence to engage in a ‘politics of spectacle’ that contributes to the grow-
ing populist sentiment that is framed and promoted differently on both sides of 
the conflict. Through their public online discourse the hacker groups construct 
a ‘patriotic hacker’ identity and attempt to establish their side as the one with 
greater ‘moral authority’, while at the same time seeking to ‘other’ their foes and 
the side they represent as a less legitimate party to the conflict.
The research takes on board Maura Conway’s recent suggestions to expand 
research on online extremism and terrorism, specifically by widening the range 
of  types of  extremism studied and in engaging with interdisciplinary approaches 
such as internet, society and technology studies.7 The paper also heeds Conway’s 
call for engaging in deeper analyses of  online extremist activity and discourse 
by examining them through the lens of  a larger set of  political concerns and 
positing connections between online extremist actors’ behaviour and the grow-
ing global trends towards nationalism and populism in modern hybrid 
conflicts.
HACKERS IN THE LIMELIGHT
The politics of hacking
The debates about who hackers are and what exactly they do go back to the early 
days of the internet and beyond. Overall, the hacking community has always 
7Maura Conway, ‘Determining the role of the internet in violent extremism and terrorism: six 
suggestions for progressing research’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40 (1) (2016), 77–98.
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been composed of a diverse set of individuals who may be said to share some 
common principles such as freedom, privacy, meritocracy and access.8 Though 
these values are not exclusive to hackers, those who adopt the label have refash-
ioned these ongoing political concerns through technological means, demon-
strating the relevance of these moral and legal issues for the digital age. Gradually, 
though, the hacking community has shifted from being preoccupied with the 
politics of technology to a concern with politics writ large, as evident from hack-
ers taking active roles in anarchist and anti-globalisation movements.9
An important point to be made about the history of hacking is that the ‘com-
munity’ as such is an amalgamation of different groups and individuals who 
share some similarities, but also differ significantly in their motivations, values 
and how-I-came-to-hacking stories—and, importantly, not every activity hack-
ers engage in is intrinsically illegal (in fact, most are perfectly within legal 
bounds). This difference in what Coleman terms hacker ‘genealogies’ has led to 
the emergence of different genres of hacking, from open-source software culture 
to unauthorised hacking for profit to state-sponsored hacking and cyber war-
fare.10 The debates about the ethics of hacking have been ongoing since its early 
days, but due to its rhizomatic nature, they remain ambiguous and open to 
 interpretation and contestation.11,12
One such debate revolves around the legitimacy of  hackers’ political par-
ticipation. Though hacking has been stereotyped as destructive and inher-
ently malicious, there are those who argue it can be a legitimate form of 
activism. Brian Still argues that ‘hacktivism’ as a form of  disobedience or 
disruption is increasingly used to challenge the authority of  oppressive 
regimes, and Molly Sauter cites the examples of  DDoS attacks perpetrated by 
Anonymous, a loose collective of  hackers and other internet users, against 
Amazon and PayPal after these companies attempted to block the activities 
of  whistle-blower website Wikileaks in 2010.13,14 Whether aimed at nation 
states or corporate entities, the grass-roots, bottom-up nature of  these efforts 
emerges as a key condition for recognition of  their activist claims, often cou-
pled with public messaging or manifesto-style communiqués posted online to 
explain the significance of  the hack.
On the other side of  the spectrum is state-sponsored hacking, which 
experts often place in the same category as industrial espionage, as the tar-
gets include not just communication networks and data repositories, but also 
financial systems, energy grids and other crucial infrastructure.15 Some 
groups have been directly implicated as nation state actors (among them 
China’s military-based Unit 61398, Bashar al-Assad-friendly Syrian 
8Gabriella Coleman, ‘The anthropology of hackers’, The Atlantic, 21 September 2010, avail-
able at: http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/09/the-anthropology-of-hack-
ers/63308/ (6 September 2017).
9Jeffrey S. Juris, Networking futures: the movements against corporate globalization (Durham 
and London, 2008), 96.
10Coleman, ‘The anthropology of hackers’.
11Steven Levy, Hackers: heroes of the computer revolution (New York, 1st edn, 1984).
12The term ‘rhizomatic’ here is informed by the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari who 
saw a ‘rhizome’—a network of roots with no explicit centre—as an alternative to centralised 
systems.
13Brian Still, ‘Hacking for a cause’, First Monday 10 (9) (2016), available at: http://firstmonday.
org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1274/1194 (6 September 2017).
14Molly Sauter, The coming swarm: DDOS actions, hacktivism, and civil disobedience on the 
internet (New York and London, 2014).
15Bernard Everett, ‘Optically transparent: the rise of industrial espionage and state-sponsored 
hacking’, Computer Fraud & Security 10 (2013), 13–16.
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Electronic Army, as well as groups affiliated with governments in Israel and 
Iran) or found to have direct ties to non-state groups, such as Hamas’ Gaza 
Cybergang, Hezbollah-affiliated Qadmon or IS-supporting hackers.16 But 
more often than not, finding explicit evidence of  a state running hacker 
groups proves difficult. Particularly in recent years, security experts and 
intelligence officials have pointed to several groups and individuals, includ-
ing APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) 28, Fancy Bear and Guccifer 2.0 as 
having ties to the Russian foreign intelligence service and other state agen-
cies. These groups have been implicated in the disruption of  the 2016 US 
election through interfering in American voter registration systems and leak-
ing the emails from the hacked Democratic National Committee (DNC) 
servers. But unlike the case of  China’s fairly organised government hackers, 
there is little tangible evidence to connect the DNC hackers to Russia’s state 
security apparatus.17 At least in part, this is because these hacking teams do 
not operate as official structures within the hierarchy of  state or military 
bureaucracy, but instead work in loose groups under assumed identities, 
resorting to opportunistic manoeuvres and borrowing software and malware 
solutions from other sources instead of  running a sterile, secretive in-house 
development lab.
Having only a tenuous connection to the state and those in power offers 
hackers another opportunity: that of presenting themselves as independent 
actors or free agents, and thus, of having the potential to shape public opinion 
with the work they do beyond official state propaganda. As Alexander Klimburg 
notes, a modern state’s cyber power (or really, its power overall) requires coordi-
nating operational and policy efforts within government structures, within inter-
national alliances and with non-state actors, including industry experts and 
civil  society.18 But posing as non-state actors, regardless of the level of their 
connection to state bodies, leaves hacker collectives with a certain amount of 
discursive freedom to frame their activities and narratives as ‘grass-roots activ-
ism’, potentially inviting more sympathy or even greater trust from the public. 
This is why it is especially important to be attentive to the self-presentation work 
hacker groups do in public, as well as to their more direct and clandestine efforts 
to disrupt infrastructure, bring down websites and leak information from hacked 
email servers.
Identity performance, spectacle and online discourse
Social media today provide important spaces for public and private identity per-
formances and are routinely used by various actors to create and maintain pres-
ences, as well as shape public opinion about themselves. Digital platforms help 
construct all kinds of selves for individuals and communities: Manuel Castells 
distinguishes between legitimising identities, used by dominant actors such as 
governments to extend and rationalise their hegemonic dominance in societies; 
resistance identities, employed by counter-publics vying to overthrow the domi-
nant status quo and present alternative ideas; and project identities, built by 
social actors who seek to redefine their position in society and thereby transform 
16OWL Cybersecurity, ‘A survey of nation sponsored hackers’, blog post, 30 April 2017, available 
at: https://www.owlcyber.com/blog/2017/2/23/nation-state-sponsored-hackers (6 September 2017). 
17Andrew E. Kramer and Andrew Higgins, ‘In Ukraine, a malware expert who could blow the 
whistle on Russian hacking’, New York Times, 16 August 2017, available at: https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/08/16/world/europe/russia-ukraine-malware-hacking-witness.html (6 September 2017). 
18Alexander Klimburg, ‘Mobilising cyber power’, Survival 53 (1) (2011), 41–60: 43.
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the overall social structure or some layer thereof.19 This last form of identity 
construction emerges as key for hacker collectives in the context of this study, as 
these hackers seek to transform the public’s image of them as a community and 
to reconfigure their role within the political and social discourse. To do this, they 
supplement their more habitual digital activity with increasingly active partici-
pation in the discursive networks underpinned by social media platforms.
The performative, public nature of hackers’ online discursive work seems to 
represent the front stage where the actors manage the public’s impressions and 
articulate particular elements of their identity. According to Erving Goffman, 
the front stage is in a dialectic relationship with a backstage, a more secretive 
space where the authentic, secret self  resides.20 For hacking communities (and 
individuals), the backstage is represented by their direct action, most of which 
occurs online and is generally kept under wraps. Backstage activities may include 
hacking government and media websites; DDoS attacks on state systems, energy 
grids, transport networks, banking systems; malware distribution and 
spear-phishing attacks via email; and leaks of stolen information such as email 
content, contacts, financial records, sensitive data or other personal information 
(a form of exposing known as doxing). These actions are the essential work of 
hackers, but they gain meaning only when placed in the context of motivations 
and reasoning for the act itself. This is where front-stage performance becomes 
important. Still draws a comparison between traditional hacker community 
websites, usually fairly closed communities where hackers post about their 
exploits, and the more outward-directed online manifestos and declarations of 
activist hackers that allow them to share ideas and profess support for particular 
causes, thereby explaining their actions.21 Creating a social media presence allows 
hackers to further expand the front stage (while preserving the backstage to 
some extent), by entering and participating in the existing political and social 
conversations in these networks and renegotiating their identities in terms of 
power and access to the public eye. Inserting themselves into the public agenda 
in this way also allows the hackers to counter existing mainstream media narra-
tives about themselves, which have heretofore overwhelmingly equated hackers 
with criminals.22 Such front-stage discursive action may include establishing and 
maintaining social media accounts and websites; reporting on hacker activity 
and ‘successes’; producing PR and publicity materials such as press-releases and 
manifestos; and networking with other actors. But as hackers enter the ‘politics 
writ large’ arena, they can also be observed joining in political debates and 
throwing their weight behind particular causes, parties and individuals. Especially 
in conflicts and crises, this discursive work can also take on a flavour of ‘us vs 
them’, expanding the identity performance and constructing it in opposition to 
a less legitimate ‘other’.
As part of a hybridised identity performance, the discursive practices of hack-
ers become just as important as their actual (mostly covert) work of hacking, if  
not more so. In these networked spaces, their actions and their meaning are 
amplified and inscribed in existing political and social processes, generating addi-
tional debate around the hackers’ activity and motivations. While this public 
19Manuel Castells, The power of identity. The information age: economy, society, and culture, 
Volume II (Chichester, 2nd edn, 2011).
20Erving Goffman, The presentation of self in everyday life (London, 1978).
21Still, ‘Hacking for a cause’.
22Molly Sauter, ‘Kevin Mitnick, the New York Times, and the media’s conception of the hacker’, 
in Jeremy Hunsinger and Andrew Schrock (eds), Making our world: the hacker and maker move-
ments in context (New York, forthcoming). Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2943042 (6 
September 2017). 
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presence bears certain risks for the traditionally private members of the hacker 
community, it also offers opportunities. Coleman notes that despite their habit-
ual secrecy, there has historically been a certain affinity for spectacle among 
hackers (stemming from their reactions to surveillance and their entanglement 
with phreaking and hoaxer cultures, and later, the culture of trolling).23 The spec-
tacular nature of social media discourse is also a way for hackers to make their 
clandestine activity more readily understandable in the context of a political 
moment, a crisis or a conflict—‘to dramatise the unseen and expose associations 
elusive to the eye’.24 Social media networks allow hackers to add the tactics of 
spectacle to their political arsenal in the service of whatever cause or ideological 
project they’re supporting, be it pro-state, pro-terrorist group, pro-activist group, 
anti-establishment, anti-corporate or anti-government. By engaging in this kind 
of spectacular public discourse, hackers are able to articulate their imagined 
identity in political, moral and affective terms. Examining their online utterances 
and social media practices can thus prove fruitful in understanding how the 
hackers’ constructed identity fits into the broader political and ideological 
context.
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Online ethnography
Understanding the online discursive practices of a particular user group (hack-
ers) on social media is best achieved through online ethnography—a non-reac-
tive approach to observation by a passive observer.25 Such an approach, also 
known as digital or virtual ethnography, allows us to unobtrusively observe the 
social media activity and the content (discourse) it generates over a period of 
time and to collect extant data without directly engaging with the subjects 
(although participatory ethnographies are also possible).26 Observing how tech-
nology is used by people—in this case, to construct identities and generate or 
enter existing discourses—is a key element of digital ethnography, with the 
researcher’s field being the networked space of connections and communication 
exchanges rather than a geographic location of a material site.
Twitter as an ethnographic space is problematic since it is a large, public site, 
and that makes it difficult to draw the boundaries of enquiry.27 It becomes an 
even more complex task when we acknowledge that Twitter is just one of many 
online platforms and spaces that hacker communities inhabit. In this case, a 
network field site approach suggested by Jenna Burrell seems more productive: 
it reframes a particular platform as a single part of a ‘network composed of 
fixed and moving points including spaces, people, and objects’.28 Twitter, then, is 
perceived as one of many network nodes used by our community of interest, 
including other social media platforms, other online or offline locations, and 
content. Online ethnography on a particular network field site can be further 
23Gabriella Coleman, ‘Phreaks, hackers, and trolls: the politics of transgression and spectacle’, 
in Michael Mandiberg (ed.), The social media reader (New York and London, 2012), 99–119: 102.
24Stephen Duncombe, Dream: re-imagining progressive politics in an age of fantasy (New York, 
2007), 156–57.
25Janet Salmonds, Doing qualitative research online (Thousand Oaks, 2015), 119.
26Christine Hine, Virtual ethnography (Thousand Oaks, 2000).
27Alice E. Marwick, ‘Ethnographic and qualitative research on Twitter’, in Katrin Weller et al. 
(eds), Twitter and society (New York, 2014), 109–22.
28Jenna Burrell, ‘The field site as a network: a strategy for locating ethnographic research’, Field 
Methods 21 (2) (2009), 181–99: 189.
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delimited by focusing on a specific set of accounts or keywords, informed by 
prior research or existing context.
Focusing on Twitter as a platform of choice for this study has its limitations, 
as interactions between groups and discursive connections may be transient and 
difficult to pin down. But since this study is mostly concerned with how commu-
nities construct identities online, and less with how they interact with one 
another, the benefits of Twitter as a coherent networked environment that offers 
multiple affordances for self-presentation and identity performance outweigh 
the limitations.
For the purposes of this enquiry, unstructured ethnographic observation was 
conducted on a number of designated Twitter accounts of key hacker groups 
that identify as pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian. The sampling choice was 
informed by the researcher’s prior knowledge of the overall context of the 
Russia-Ukraine conflict and the platform environment and affordances. Twitter 
observations were supplemented by a review of complementary online materials 
linked to or embedded by the group accounts in their tweets for comprehensive 
analysis and triangulation.
The accounts on which observation was conducted and whose content was 
analysed include two most influential and active hacker collectives in the 
Ukraine-Russia conflict: 1) CyberBerkut (https://twitter.com/cyberberkut2), a 
pro-Russian hacker group; 2) Ukrainian Cyber Alliance, a pro-Ukrainian hacker 
collective comprised of three key subgroups, each with their own account: 
Falcons Flame (https://twitter.com/16ff255/), Trinity (https://twitter.com/
opstrinity) and RUH8 (https://twitter.com/_ruhate_). These publicly accessible 
accounts were observed and examined in their entirety to collect the practices 
and the discourse in the posts of both collectives during the conflict period 
(2014–17). Each account was observed in the desktop browser iteration of 
Twitter throughout 2016 and 2017, to garner general information such as 
account bio and tweeting practices. Additionally, tweets were collected using 
Sifter, an online tool that grants access to historical Twitter data. Extant data 
collection yielded hundreds of Twitter posts (1,671 in total, as of early August 
2017) and additional linked content from related platforms, including websites, 
blogs, Facebook pages, videos and multimedia, providing a rich framework from 
which insights were drawn through further analysis and comparisons.
Analysing online discourse and practices
As a social media platform with particular affordances, Twitter imposes its own 
vernacular on users, offering them a set of formats and features that become part 
of the networked communication practices and can define how certain interac-
tions or performances occur. Twitter posts as online discourse are condensed, 
chronological, discrete, shareable, embeddable and networked. All of these char-
acteristics influence the strategies individuals and communities choose in order 
to perform their identities and participate in certain broader political and ideo-
logical discourses. Beyond the actual content of Twitter posts, features such as 
retweets and mentions emerge as discursive markers of connection and engage-
ment with larger frameworks of meaning and action, while the use of hashtags 
allows us to theorise about Twitter discourse as ‘searchable talk’, a set of over-
lapping discursive spaces where attention, outrage or empathy can be focused.29 
29Hongqiang Zhu, ‘Searchable talk as discourse practice on the internet: the case of “#binders-
fullofwomen”’, Discourse, Context & Media 12 (2016), 87–98.
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Moreover, the inclusion of links to external online platforms and embedded mul-
timedia content helps to create a complex, multi-layered infrastructure of online 
discourse that is best understood as a practice and not just as static content 
posted at certain intervals and then preserved as an archive.
There are a number of approaches to analysing social media content as 
speech. Both textual (or content) analysis and discourse analysis yield important 
insights, allowing for finding meaning and interpreting the patterns in a corpus 
of data on various levels: descriptive, interpretive and explanatory. For instance, 
in her study of networked identity performance on Twitter, Zizi Papacharissi 
used content analysis to determine descriptive features of Twitter posts such as 
trending hashtags and @replies, as well as strategies for performativity.30 
Papacharissi then applied discourse analysis to the same sample of tweets to 
arrive at a deeper interpretation of the performative practices and the vernacu-
lar of the ‘polysemic’ networked self.31 As a means of revealing ‘how texts are 
constructed’, discourse analysis is essential when seeking to understand the 
broader ideological structures and entanglements of power on which the dis-
course rests.32 In the present case of hackers engaging in a public performance of 
their identities online, such linguistic and textual expressions can indeed be 
understood as social practice, where what is being said is as important as how 
and why these discourses appear in the public sphere. By applying the three-
stage model of discourse analysis (encompassing the descriptive, the interpretive 
and the explanatory stages) to both the contents of the Twitter posts and the 
platform features that wrap around them, it is possible to reveal the hierarchies 
of power and dominant ideologies underpinning the conflict the hacker groups 
are party to and to illuminate the processes of legitimation and delegitimation 
of particular ideas or actors in this context.33,34
The Twitter accounts selected for this study were analysed using content 
analysis and discourse analysis applied to the accounts as a whole, including 
account data and metadata, the corpus of tweets collected from each account 
and the platform-specific features and practices used by the account holders. All 
of these elements were subjected to the process of horizontalisation, where every 
statement and act was taken to be of equal value before assigning categories and 
eliciting meanings.35 These were coded to elicit key themes and patterns in the 
discourse around hacker activities and statements in the context of the Ukraine-
Russia conflict. Such a contextualised analysis allows for a rich, multi-layered 
canvas of descriptive findings, supplemented by interpretive and explanatory 
analysis of the spectacular public performance and self-presentation strategies 
of pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian hacker groups online.
DISCURSIVE PRACTICES OF HACKER COLLECTIVES IN THE UKRAINE-RUSSIA 
CONFLICT
The grass-roots hacker collectives operating on both sides of the Ukraine-Russia 
conflict have enjoyed significant public attention thanks to initial (and ongoing) 
30Zizi Papacharissi, ‘Without you, I’m nothing: performances of the self  on Twitter’, 
International Journal of Communication 6 (2012), 1989–2006.
31Papacharissi, ‘Without you, I’m nothing’, 1993.
32Norman Fairclough, Language and power (Harlow, 2nd edn, 2011), 89.
33Norman Fairclough, Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language (New York and 
Oxford, 2nd edn, 2013).
34Theo Van Leeuwen, ‘Legitimation in discourse and communication’, Discourse & 
Communication 1 (1) (2007), 91–112.
35Clark Moustakas, Phenomenological research methods (Thousand Oaks, 1994).
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media coverage of their activities, and that attention has only grown as they have 
cultivated their social media profiles during the time of the conflict. Though 
individuals behind these groups have reported extensively on their exploits and 
many of the specific attacks have been documented, little is known about the 
actors themselves.36 Neither CyberBerkut nor Ukrainian Cyber Alliance are 
explicitly state-run, but their practices reportedly enjoy tenuous approval from 
government officials.37 The hacktivist groups have at various times been rumoured 
to pass information to law enforcement and state security services as well as col-
laborating with other activist groups.38 On both sides, the hackers do not always 
share the official government point of view on the particulars of the conflict, but 
choose to publicly ally themselves with either Ukraine or Russia as a country 
and a party to the conflict.
CyberBerkut is a pro-Russian hacker group, comprised of at least four indi-
viduals, which has interfered in a number of Ukrainian government and military 
networks and has leaked official documents, aiming to embarrass and under-
mine the Ukrainian side. Security researchers claim CyberBerkut are likely 
Ukrainians or Russians with links to Ukraine, most probably supporters of the 
country’s pro-Russian former president Viktor Yanukovych, who was ousted in 
2014 in the wake of the Euromaidan protest.39 The pro-Russian hackers first 
garnered attention with a series of DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks 
on a number of Western and Ukrainian institutions, including NATO and the 
Ukrainian Ministry of Defence. They also claim responsibility for the massive 
hacking attack on the servers of Ukraine’s Central Election Commission in May 
2014, when they attempted to interfere with the software used in announcing the 
results of a Presidential Election (the hack did not sway the outcome of the elec-
tion). 40 Some reports allege that CyberBerkut might be one of the aliases for the 
infamous Russian hacker group Fancy Bear, implicated in the hack of the DNC 
and tied to Russian interference in the US elections. Most recently, in the sum-
mer of 2017, CyberBerkut released a cache of stolen emails alleging that Hillary 
Clinton had colluded with Ukraine during the US election.41 Most of the stolen 
data that CyberBerkut hackers obtain is released through their website or 
through Pastebin, an info dump website often frequented by hackers, and then 
promoted on their various social media channels.
Ukrainian Cyber Alliance is a much looser collective of several different 
groups and individuals (anywhere between 10 and 15 people overall) who joined 
forces to battle their pro-Russian counterparts and wreak havoc on the Russian 
state and military officials. Although its various members have been operating 
since the spring of 2014, the Alliance was formed in the spring of 2016, and is 
comprised of the Falcons Flame and Trinity groups and a lone hacker called 
RUH8, with occasional participation from certain members of the CyberHunta, 
36Tim Maurer and Scott Janz, ‘The Russia-Ukraine conflict: cyber and information warfare in 
a regional context’, The International Relations and Security Network 17 (2014).
37Jeff  Stone, ‘Meet CyberBerkut, the pro-Russian hackers waging anonymous-style cyberwar-
fare against Ukraine’, International Business Times, 17 December 2015, available at: http://www.
ibtimes.com/meet-cyberberkut-pro-russian-hackers-waging-anonymous-style-cyberwar-
fare-against-2228902 (6 September 2017). 
38Christopher Miller, ‘Inside the Ukrainian “hacktivist” network cyberbattling the Kremlin’, 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2 November 2016, available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/
ukraine-hacktivist-network-cyberwar-on-kremlin/28091216.html (6 September 2017).
39Stone, ‘Meet CyberBerkut’.
40Greenberg, ‘How an entire nation became Russia’s test lab for cyberwar’.
41Kramer and Higgins, ‘In Ukraine, a malware expert who could blow the whistle on Russian 
hacking’.
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yet another pro-Ukrainian hacktivist group.42 Ukrainian Cyber Alliance hackers 
state their mission is to ‘expose Kremlin meddling in Ukraine’, and they’ve also 
openly admitted that CyberBerkut is their Russian/pro-Russian counterpart and 
is therefore also one of their targets. The Ukrainian hackers’ notable achieve-
ments in the conflict include hundreds of hacked and exposed email inboxes and 
social media profiles of pro-Russian separatists and their ‘Russian curators’. 
Their most recent star moment came in October 2016 with the massive leak of 
more than a gigabyte of e-mails and text documents from the allegedly hacked 
inbox of one of Russian President Putin’s key aides, Vladislav Surkov (who also 
happens to be the Russian government’s point person for international negotia-
tions on the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine).43 The Alliance has its own 
Facebook page, but no Twitter account. Instead, each of its constituent parts—
Falcons Flame, Trinity and RUH8—runs their own Twitter feed as part of their 
joint social media presence.
Key textual and discursive practices
Analysis of 1,671 Twitter posts from the CyberBerkut account and the three 
Ukrainian Cyber Alliance accounts yields a wealth of observations about how 
the hacker collectives use their social media presence to do self-presentation 
work and construct their identities in particular ways. There are several layers of 
data in the posts that lend themselves to various depths of meaning and inter-
pretation. On a superficial level, there is the content of the posts themselves, 
including the words or sentences, embedded images or videos, the use of exter-
nal links, and so on. On the same level are the affordances of Twitter as a plat-
form used in each post, such as retweets, mentions or hashtags. All of these 
reveal what the hacker groups talk about or what they do in this public space 
and, to some extent, how they produce meaning from their discourse and prac-
tices. Examining the content and the use of platform affordances generates 
descriptive findings that are nonetheless illuminating and that feed into a deeper 
analysis of the hackers’ discursive practices.
For both the pro-Russian CyberBerkut hackers and the Ukrainian Cyber 
Alliance, the majority of Twitter posts reported on their achievements and suc-
cesses. CyberBerkut, for instance, boasted about hacking the PC of Ukraine’s 
chief  military prosecutor and about taking down several ‘fascist’ (nationalist) 
Ukrainian websites, while the allied Ukrainian hackers reported taking down 
pro-Russian news websites and doxing the Russian military who fought along-
side separatist forces in Ukraine. While CyberBerkut’s reports were mostly 
declarative or linked to their website, the Ukrainian Cyber Alliance also linked 
to mainstream media coverage of their successes, along with links to their own 
webpages. Both groups added screen captures of key hacks and leaked material 
as additional proof of their work. On a more conceptual level, the hackers also 
occasionally shared links to manifestos or mission statements justifying their 
work and, in the case of Ukrainian Cyber Alliance’s RUH8 account, even linked 
to a Facebook post with philosophical musings about the role of hacking in 
propaganda and persuasion efforts during conflicts. These contributed to the 
construction of the public hacker identity on Twitter.
42Miller, ‘Inside the Ukrainian “hacktivist” network cyberbattling the Kremlin’.
43Shaun Walker, ‘Kremlin puppet master’s leaked emails are price of return to political front-
line’, Guardian, 26 October 2016, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/26/
kremlin-puppet-masters-leaked-emails-vladislav-surkov-east-ukraine (6 September 2017).
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Beyond directly reporting on their work, both sets of hacktivists frequently 
named specific individuals and organisations involved in the conflict, including 
activists, government officials, military personnel, journalists and others. These 
names often featured as the victims of hacking activity and were often ‘exposed’ 
as key operatives on the opposing side when their personal email inboxes or 
webpages were hacked. In several instances, both sides also mentioned their 
hacker ‘nemesis’ in the context of the conflict, mostly to jeer at their incompe-
tence (Ukrainian Cyber Alliance at one point posted a scan of a passport which 
it claimed belonged to one of the members of CyberBerkut). The pro-Russian 
group used Twitter to recruit likeminded volunteers to join their team.
Both the pro-Russian and the pro-Ukrainian hackers actively attempted to 
contextualise their discourse and work in the broader conflict situation by offer-
ing additional detail on the events. In their tweets, CyberBerkut and Ukrainian 
Cyber Alliance established who were the key actors and parties to the conflict, 
as well as offering commentary on the political and military situation. 
CyberBerkut often tweeted about Ukraine and Western states, as well as 
pro-Russian separatist rebels in the conflict, but barely mentioned direct Russian 
involvement, presenting the Kremlin as an innocent bystander. Ukrainian Cyber 
Alliance gave Russia the centre stage, frequently mentioning Russian officials 
and military figures, as well as drawing clear connections between Russian forces 
and the separatist militias in eastern Ukraine. Both collectives also exposed var-
ious foreign and international actors allegedly participating in the conflict 
behind the scenes: pro-Ukrainian hackers claimed to have evidence of foreign 
fighters joining pro-Russian separatist ranks, while CyberBerkut accused US 
think-tanks of lobbying for lethal weapons for the Ukrainian side and even of 
fomenting a ‘colour revolution’ in Russia akin to the Ukrainian Euromaidan 
protest.
In terms of using the features afforded by Twitter as a platform, there were 
many similarities between the two groups. Both of them used links quite heavily, 
linking to their other social media pages and websites, but Ukrainian Cyber 
Alliance linked to other media and activist ally websites, while CyberBerkut 
remained fairly insular. Because the Ukrainian hackers operated several Twitter 
accounts, they also retweeted each other and their allies quite a lot—in fact, 
retweets make up the bulk of their Twitter activity. Hashtags were used perva-
sively by both collectives to connect their activity to existing discourses, such as 
#Ukraine, #Russia, #ATO (anti-terrorist operation, the term official Ukraine 
uses for the conflict), or to frame the conflict in a specific light (Ukrainian hack-
ers were quite fond of the hashtags #TheHague and #HagueCourt, referring to 
Russia’s military activity in Ukraine as crimes that should be investigated in the 
International Criminal Court). Hashtags promoting the collectives them-
selves—#CyberBerkut and #UCA, respectively—were used frequently, espe-
cially in tweets containing reports of successful operations. Textual content was 
augmented with embedded images and videos: though CyberBerkut’s early 
tweets were mostly text-only, they quickly caught up with Ukrainian Cyber 
Alliance, whose accounts actively employed multimedia and even branded con-
tent with their own logo.
The initial findings of this analysis don’t just reveal the content and feature 
choices of the hacker groups on Twitter, but can also be interpreted as markers 
of certain discursive practices that these groups engaged in. Applying this inter-
pretivist paradigm informs our understanding beyond what subjects and themes 
were discussed and extends it to asking how the hacker collectives chose to pro-
duce these meanings and share them. This interpretive stage can further 
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illuminate the performative work and identity construction that hackers do on 
social media.
The hackers’ most visible discursive practice—framing their hacking activ-
ity in particular ways on a public platform—is evident from a prevalence of 
discourse about their own actions. First of  all, the hacker groups are able to 
present themselves as more public actors, combining reports on their clandes-
tine work with more outwardly oriented messages such as manifestos, philo-
sophical musings and political demands. This is a potent example of  how 
social media can enable a convergence of  the backstage and the front-stage 
performances, collapsing public and private contexts into an experience that is 
at once spectacular and intimate.44 Second of  all, both CyberBerkut and 
Ukrainian Cyber Alliance explicitly frame themselves as grass-roots actors, 
distancing themselves from the state and embracing terms such as ‘partisan’ or 
‘guerrilla’. This also serves to promote a collective identity that is more 
 authentic, personalised and may drive the social media audience to be more 
sympathetic to the hackers’ agenda.
Another discursive strategy the hacker groups employ is embedding their 
work and their performance in the broader political and social context of  the 
conflict between Russia and Ukraine. By connecting their activities and opin-
ions to other events and trends within the ongoing struggle, and by placing 
themselves alongside other actors such as government officials, military 
structures, international bodies, media outlets and activist groups, the hack-
ers at once give their actions more meaning and rationalise themselves as 
legitimate actors on a par with every other participant in the conflict. This 
contextual embedding not only gives them legitimacy, but normalises their 
hacking as a routine part of  conflict, a daily element of  hybrid warfare and 
a form of  political expression.
Finally, the public performances of pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian hacker 
groups not only become a seemingly natural part of the grass-roots activism and 
a routine element of the hybrid war, but allow the hackers to refashion their own 
identities, to impose their interpretations on the identities of their foes and, ulti-
mately, to reshape the meaning of the political situation as a whole. By discuss-
ing their motivations and values, by sharing moral judgements about their 
opponents and by labelling various actors and phenomena—often with highly 
charged terms such as ‘fascist’, ‘anti-fascist’, ‘genocide’, ‘junta’, ‘terrorist’—each 
group draws its own map of the conflict, defining the parties engaged in it (who 
is fighting) as well as the relative moral stances of each (who is the bad guy). 
Such moral evaluation and labelling isn’t limited to the hackers on the opposing 
side, but stretches to encompass the opposing side as a whole.45 Because discur-
sively each hacker group has already embedded itself  in the broader networked 
context of the conflict and is now performing as part of a ‘people’, whether of 
pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian persuasion, it is able to interpret the value of 
their work in undermining particular actors in the conflict as serving a greater 
purpose. As they redefine the very meaning and the causes of the conflict itself  
through their spectacular performance online, the hackers are thus able to dis-
cursively legitimise themselves and their allies and at once to delegitimise their 
opponents, the work they do and the values—and people—they stand for or 
represent.
44Papacharissi, ‘Without you, I’m nothing’, 1990.
45Van Leeuwen, ‘Legitimation in discourse and communication’.
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CONSTRUCTING THE ‘PATRIOTIC HACKER’ DISCOURSE
The findings from the descriptive analysis of the text and the features of hacker 
groups’ Twitter communications and the interpretive analysis of their discursive 
practices combine to inform the third, explanatory stage of discourse analysis. 
Here, the analysis seeks to explain how the discourse feeds into and reflects the 
‘sociocultural practice’ surrounding the text.46 By considering the ideological 
and social structures in which the text is produced and consumed, we can spec-
ulate about how the rules and norms of these structures affect how the text is 
understood and how sociopolitical meaning is created through discourse. Van 
Dijk outlines a similar ‘social-cognitive’ model to explain the relationship 
between the textual practice and the sociocultural practice, mediated at the dis-
cursive level.47 The aim of this multi-layered approach to analysis is to under-
stand the links between ‘texts, discourse practices, and sociocultural practices’ in 
identifying how hacker groups construct their identities on social media as part 
of a particular sociocultural environment and how their discursive performances 
contribute to shaping the broader discourse around the conflict.48
In the case of the ongoing confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, social 
media have been used extensively to promote conflicting (and often false) narra-
tives of the situation and to impose or subvert certain values, moral tone and 
ideological colouring of particular aspects of the conflict.49,50 Many of these 
attempts at framing and manipulation of public opinion stemmed from strategic 
state narratives and ideology, but were buttressed (or in some cases, subverted) 
by grass-roots discursive activity on social network platforms. Recent research 
has shown that both Russia and Ukraine take propagation and dissemination of 
strategic narratives about the conflict quite seriously and consider these battles 
in the digital and communications domains a part of the ongoing ‘information 
war’ that is as crucial as the military, economic and other aspects of the confron-
tation.51 Especially in the networked social media sphere, those who craft state 
communications and propaganda strategy in Russia (and, increasingly, in 
Ukraine) are well aware of its potential for ‘mobilising its supporters, demonis-
ing its enemy, demoralising its enemy’s government and armed forces, and legit-
imising its own actions’.52 Apart from attempts to control and police social 
media discourse through censorship of particular topics or resources and block-
ing key pages, a less ham-handed and more nuanced opportunity to manipulate 
discussions and opinions is presented by seemingly independent or grass-roots 
actors whose own discursive practices feed into and align with the strategic state 
narratives. From the above interpretive analysis, we have already seen that 
pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian hacker collectives are actively working to embed 
46Fairclough, Critical discourse analysis.
47Teun A. Van Dijk, ‘Principles of critical discourse analysis’, Discourse & Society 4 (2) (1993), 
249–83.
48Norman Fairclough, Media discourse (London, 1995).
49Mykola Makhortykh and Yehor Lyebyedyev, ‘# SaveDonbassPeople: Twitter, propaganda, 
and conflict in Eastern Ukraine’, The Communication Review 18 (4) (2015), 239–70.
50Anastasiia Bezverkha and Tetyana Lokot, ‘#Krymnash (#CrimeaIsOurs): the discursive (de)
legitimation of the annexation of Crimea’, presented at the 2016 Critical Studies Research Group 
Conference on Resistance (Brighton, 2016).
51Stephen Hutchings and Joanna Szostek, ‘Dominant narratives in Russian political and media 
discourse during the Ukraine crisis’, in Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Richard Sakwa 
(eds), Ukraine and Russia: people, politics, propaganda and perspectives (Bristol, 2015), 173–85.
52Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili, Sanda Svetoka and Kenneth Geers, ‘Strategic communication 
and social media in the Russia Ukraine conflict’, Cyber War in perspective: Russian aggression 
against Ukraine (Tallinn, 2015).
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themselves in the broader political discourse around the conflict and to exert 
certain power on how the understanding of the conflict and the reasons behind 
it are being shaped. But how do their efforts align with the strategic narratives of 
Russia and Ukraine?
In some ways, the conflict initiated by Russia on Ukrainian soil with the 
annexation of Crimea in 2014, and later, with support of the separatist rebellions 
in eastern Ukraine, was the culmination of an ongoing renegotiation of collec-
tive identities of Russians and Ukrainians in light of the complex historical rela-
tionship between the two countries. Scholars note that Russia’s public strategic 
narratives during the conflict, beyond grievances with Western meddling, have 
centred on the concept of ‘Russian nationhood’ and the idea of the ‘Russian 
world’, a grand nation-building effort that the Russian state has intensified under 
President Vladimir Putin.53,54 This populist narrative emerged from an identity 
crisis in Russia in the wake of the Soviet collapse and attempts to reconcile the 
state’s former imperial greatness and the USSR’s status as a major global player 
with a world where the centres of power have shifted significantly during the last 
30 years. In the context of the conflict, this narrative has found its shape in 
 language that calls for rescuing Russian ‘compatriots’ and ‘ethnic Russians’ on 
hostile soil, designating ‘national traitors’ and defining ‘traditional values’.55
At the same time, Ukraine has been reconfiguring its own collective identity, 
suspended for a time between close historical, cultural and economic ties with 
Russia and an emerging narrative of Ukraine as ‘part of Europe’.56 In a contest 
for greater agency that has been ongoing since Ukraine gained independence in 
1991, the country has long struggled to form its own idea of ‘a sovereign nation’, 
and the idea of sovereignty only gained urgency with the start of the conflict in 
2014. Because of the complexities of its close relationship with Russia, exempli-
fied by ethnic, lingual and familial interpenetration of the populations of the 
two countries, the proximity of Russian influence has been interpreted differ-
ently by the split identities co-existing within Ukraine: some saw it as a threat to 
Ukrainian nationhood, while others looked upon it more favourably as a contin-
uation of a long-term cohabitation with mutual benefits. However, since 2014, 
the strategic narratives of the Ukrainian state have embraced notions of sover-
eign power, a stronger military, a unique cultural history and even nationalist 
ideals (heretofore problematic because of a tense history of nationalist Ukrainian 
organisations and criticism of existing far-right political factions), battling for 
greater agency in light of the Russian ambition to impose its own kind of 
‘nationhood’ upon Ukrainians.
Though these warring strategic narratives are clearly at odds with each other, 
the hacker collectives operating within these discourses in the networked realm 
have managed to create a popular, and even populist, identity that rests on an 
essentially similar concept—that of patriotism. Through such identity perfor-
mance, they are able to inscribe their activity into the broader narrative of the 
struggle in a manner that clearly indicates their alignment with a particular party 
to the conflict and explicates their motivations for engaging in the hacking activ-
ities as part of the confrontation.
53Hutchings and Szostek, ‘Dominant narratives in Russian political and media discourse dur-
ing the Ukraine crisis’.
54Valentina Feklyunina, ‘Soft power and identity: Russia, Ukraine and the “Russian world(s)”’, 
European Journal of International Relations 22 (4) (2016), 773–96.
55Hutchings and Szostek, ‘Dominant narratives in Russian political and media discourse dur-
ing the Ukraine crisis’.
56Feklyunina, ‘Soft power and identity’.
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Public construction and self-presentation of patriotism among journalists, 
more traditional political activists and active citizens, including in the online 
spaces, has been investigated to some extent by researchers.57 But if  we accept 
that hacker activity, hackers’ backstage disruptive work, can be political and 
that through front-stage discursive practices these groups increasingly articulate 
their politics online, we can claim that there can exist a ‘patriotic hacker’ iden-
tity. While performing patriotism is highly context-dependent and clearly spec-
tacular in nature, we can argue that it allows hackers to present themselves as a 
legitimate element of a greater strategic narrative in the conflict, and to discredit 
their opponents as unpatriotic traitors and rob them of agency by branding 
them ‘the losing side’.
In their investigation of journalists’ performances of patriotism online, 
Avshalom Ginosar and Igor Konovalov identify three main discursive indicators 
of patriotism: the adoption of governmental framing, expressions of solidarity 
and ‘ignoring the enemy’s narratives and positions’.58 Because we’ve identified 
that hacker groups in the Russia-Ukraine conflict engage in public online dis-
course around current events in the conflict, including discourse about their own 
role in the conflict, we can speculate that these indicators might also apply. There 
are, however, some interesting distinctions that relate to how hackers construct 
their own identity within the context of the confrontation, especially in relation 
to state actors. While their interpretation of the causes and dynamics of the 
conflict may at times coincide with that of the government (Russian or 
Ukrainian), the hacker groups do not always adopt the state frame, can afford to 
disagree with it and actively attempt to distance themselves from the govern-
ment by identifying themselves as independent, grass-roots actors working on 
their own initiative. Patriotism, for them, emerges as a viable motivation for such 
independent action. In fact, the solidarity they express in their online discourse, 
is not so much solidarity with the state or its officials, but solidarity with the 
nation or the people: ethnic Russians, Russian speakers and pro-Russian sepa-
ratists on one side; and Ukrainian citizens, volunteer or regular military 
Ukrainian troops, and Ukrainian activists on the other side. Finally, instead of 
ignoring the narrative of the opposing side, the hacker groups seek to actively 
discredit and delegitimise them by exposing their corrupt nature and less effec-
tive hacking and cyber warfare tactics and by labelling them as traitors in con-
trast to their own patriotic identity.
The ‘patriotic hacker’ performance allows the groups to construct their patri-
otism as part of a larger strategic narrative within the conflict and to secure its 
appeal to popular sentiment shaped by these narratives, be it the Russian idea of 
‘nationhood’ and the ‘Russian world’, or the Ukrainian idea of ‘sovereign 
agency’ and ‘national pride’. Thus authorised, the hacker groups further legiti-
mise their identity and practices through moral evaluation as they use their spec-
tacular social media performance to establish themselves and their chosen side 
as a greater ‘moral authority’ in the conflict, compared to their foes.59
Being ‘patriotic’ as a public identity for hackers in the conflict emerges as a valid 
political alternative to neutrality, objectivity or lack of alliances, markedly different 
57Zhou Kui, ‘The misplaced “apology”: rethinking China’s Internet patriotism’, positions: asia 
critique 23 (1) (2015), 49–58; Nigel James, ‘Militias, the patriot movement, and the internet: the 
ideology of conspiracism’, The Sociological Review 48 (S2) (2000), 63–92; Avshalom Ginosar and 
Igor Konovalov, ‘Patriotism on the internet: journalists’ behavior and user comments’, Media, 
War & Conflict 8 (3) (2015), 368–83.
58Ginosar and Konovalov, ‘Patriotism on the internet’, 371.
59Van Leeuwen, ‘Legitimation in discourse and communication’.
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from the meritocratic, pro-digital freedom stance of hacker collectives in the past. 
Patriotism is offered as a viable discursive stance so that the hackers feel validated in 
aligning themselves with a particular party in the conflict, expressing solidarity with 
a nation and its people. The ‘patriotic hacker’ identity also implies a certain sense of 
righteousness when engaging in activity that government and law enforcement offi-
cials may not be able to publicly engage in themselves, but may condone when it is 
done by independent third parties in the name of political gain.
Patriotism, therefore, emerges as a convenient identity marker that validates 
hackers as public actors and at once offers convincing and fairly transparent 
motivations for their engagement in the conflict. But because the pro-Russian 
CyberBerkut and the pro-Ukrainian Ukrainian Cyber Alliance both frame their 
patriotism by embedding it into markedly different strategic narratives of their 
side’s involvement in the conflict, the notion of ‘patriotic hacking’ remains con-
tested and open to various interpretations. In this complex context of overlap-
ping narratives and performative identities, patriotism might even be considered 
a floating signifier, as conceptualised by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe: 
a societal concept or term open to constant contestation and re-articulation via 
very different ideological frames.60 Because the signifier is open to interpretation, 
it may have different meaning for different groups or individuals, represent dif-
ferent signifieds, and, ultimately, mean whatever its constructors want it to 
mean.61 In the case of the ‘patriotic hacker’ construct, the two opposing sides 
seek to impose their own ideological frame upon the concept of patriotism and 
to fix its meaning—a task that ultimately proves futile, as its ambiguity is key to 
the continuing discursive struggle.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Area studies research into the role of digital media in post-Soviet states shows that 
social media can be a space for self-identification and democratic voices, but also 
a tool for autocratic stability, especially in countries with totalitarian or neo-
authoritarian regimes.62,63 Investigating how specific state and civic actors navigate 
this hybrid discursive space is therefore valuable, as it informs our understanding 
of the changing configurations of language and power in the modern era when 
digital technology and media increasingly permeate political and social life.
This study focused on the self-presentation and online discursive practices of 
grass-roots hacker collectives on both sides of the Ukraine-Russia conflict to 
reveal the key ways in which they construct and communicate their identity 
within the broader context of the confrontation. Employing textual and dis-
course analysis to examine the hacker groups’ presence and activity on Twitter, 
the research found that these collectives actively make specific choices about the 
content they post or link to on Twitter and about the use of certain platform-spe-
cific features. This results in a set of specific discursive practices: first, the hack-
ers are able to frame their hacking activity by presenting themselves as more 
public actors online and by discussing their activity as independent and explic-
itly grass-roots. They are also able to legitimise and normalise their hacking 
60Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and socialist strategy: towards a radical demo-
cratic politics (London 2001).
61Daniel Chandler, Semiotics: the basics (New York and Oxford, 3rd edn, 2017).
62Sarah Oates, Revolution stalled: the political limits of the internet in the post-Soviet sphere 
(New York, 2013).
63Seva Gunitsky, ‘Corrupting the cyber-commons: social media as a tool of autocratic stabil-
ity’, Perspectives on Politics 13 (1) (2015), 42–54.
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activity through embedding their work and their identity performance in the 
broader political and social context of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. 
Finally, through discursive practice, the hacker collectives refashion their own 
identities, impose their interpretations on the identities of their opponents and 
influence the meaning of the political situation as a whole, further validating 
their role in the political turmoil surrounding the conflict.
The research also found that by collapsing their backstage activity with front-
stage performance the pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian hackers are able to embed 
themselves in the broader strategic narratives of the opposing sides of the con-
flict and to avail of these narratives in creating their discursive identity. This 
identity is refashioned through the concept of a ‘patriotic hacker’—a floating 
signifier that allows each group to imbue the term with its own set of meanings 
and, while contested, becomes a convenient marker of popular appeal, moral 
value and belonging. Thus, both pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian hacker groups 
use social media to enter the broader populist discourse around the conflict on 
Europe’s edge, re-imagining the notions of patriotism, sovereignty and state-
hood. The analysis of public discursive practices and strategies on the pro-Rus-
sian side reveals it to be part of a larger populist push to pitch the Ukraine-Russia 
conflict as a clash of pro-Western, ‘immoral’ Ukrainian forces and the ‘properly 
patriotic’ Russian and pro-Russian forces defending Russian ‘nationhood’ and 
the ‘Russian world’, reasserting Russia’s desire for a dominant geopolitical 
stance. On the Ukrainian side of the hacker discourse, the constructed patrio-
tism emerges as a defence of self-reliance, sovereignty and ‘national pride’, help-
ing portray Ukraine as an independent state opposing a Russia with unjustified 
imperial ambitions.
The inward-directed patriotic hacker identities and discourses that emerge 
from this research are perhaps echoes of a broader global turn towards populist 
rhetoric and nationalist sentiment sweeping across Europe and the Western 
world in reaction to various political, cultural and military threats. But on a 
smaller scale, this discursive work signifies a shift from hacktivism as work of 
disobedience and disruption to patriotic hacking as ideological work that is 
inextricably tied with mainstream politics and populist political rhetoric. Given 
the rising concern with cyber warfare it is important to further research how 
hackers (both grass-roots and state-sponsored ones) articulate the nature and 
value of their work in terms of the broader political discourse. Future research 
would do well to consider the complex dance these seemingly independent actors 
engage in with state actors and how their discursive relationships help preserve 
the hegemonic status quo of particular ideologies—or tear down hostile hege-
monic regimes.
Another important reflection stemming from the study of discursive prac-
tices of hacker groups in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is that in the hybrid media 
system, online performance of patriotism emerges as an inextricable part of 
‘being patriotic’. In this case, hacker groups perform their patriotism as part of 
their public discursive identity, thereby legitimising their hacking activity and 
lending their patriotic identity additional weight by embedding themselves in 
the broader political context. With the proliferation of populist political dis-
courses, especially in areas undergoing or prone to political, ethnic or religious 
conflict, it is worth examining in more detail the meanings various participants 
in the conflict ascribe to vague, yet highly charged concepts such as ‘patriotism’, 
‘nationalism’, ‘extremism’ or ‘terrorism’, and understanding how these net-
worked discourses resonate with existing strategic narratives of nation states or 
non-state actors and with popular opinion.
